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International trade tensions—trade wars, tariffs, trade deficits, and more—
dominated global news in the late-2010s, stoking the imagination of not only 
politicians and economists but also the average citizen. This phenomenon was 
part of the public reaction to the changing policies on a global level surrounding 
international trade and investment relationships. Beginning in the latter-half of 
the twentieth century and accelerating after the end of the Cold War, the world’s 
states broke down barriers to international trade and investment through multi-
lateral treaty systems such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 These multilateral systems 
did not regulate, though, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),  the transfer of capital 
across international borders.2 Instead, the various states individually regulated 
FDI through a collection of treaties between usually two states that provided pro-
tection for the investments of a citizen of one state in the other.3 These treaties 
are known as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).4 
Most BITs offered protection to investors through the abrogation of the Rule 
of Local Remedies (the RLR), a doctrine of customary international law that re-
quires international claims be resolved in the host state’s local courts.5 Under 
these BITs, investors could file claims against the host state directly before an 
international tribunal in an arbitral proceeding known as “Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement” (ISDS).6 Since the global financial crisis in 2008, though, political 
leaders questioned the viability of such liberalized trade policies.7 Beginning 
around 2015, international political leaders renegotiated BITs to be more 
 
 1 RALPH H. FOLSON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 385–
88 (4th ed. 2017). 
 2 Id. at 721. 
 3 Id. at 765–70. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See generally, Henok Gabisa, The Fate of International Human Rights Norms in the 
Realm of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): Has Humanity Become a Collateral Damage?, 
48 THE INT’L LAW. 153 (2014) (explaining the role of BITs as a transformation of transnational 
investment and as a legal document protecting investors in a foreign country). 
 6 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: 
Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 108, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (Jan. 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter BITs 1995-2006]. 
 7 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reform-
ing International Investment Governance, 24–25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (Jun. 25, 
2015) (characterizing post-2008 policies toward BITs as an “[e]ra of re-orientation” with gov-
ernments “evaluating the costs and benefits of [BITs] and reflecting on their future objects and 
strategies as regards these treaties”). 
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protectionist, including reviving the RLR and limiting the availability of ISDS.8 
This Note will examine these reforms offered in BITs negotiated in the late-
2010s to determine whether they accomplish the goals of reformers and whether 
other legal doctrines in the international investment regime will frustrate these 
reforms.   
Part I of this Note discusses the political and legal underpinnings that led to 
the reform of BITs in the late-2010s. Part II discusses the policy interests that 
motivated reformers when drafting 2010s BITs. Part III examines the choice of 
fora and exhaustion clauses in individual BITs to determine whether they fulfil 
the policy interests that reformers sought. Part IV offers a cursory exploration of 
pitfalls that the reformed dispute resolution systems face when brought before 
international tribunals. Part V offers concluding thoughts on how these BITs and 
their dispute resolution clauses may affect the international investment regime 
and the law of ISDS tribunals. 
 
A. Contemporary Issues in International Investment Law: The ISDS 
Regime9 
 
Many of the reform efforts taken in the late-2010s stem from the failure of the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the mid- to late-2000s.10 After 
the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle failed to start a new round of trade 
negotiations, the Doha Round of the WTO also stalled as middle-income coun-
tries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa sought concessions 
to bolster their geopolitical and geo-economic positions and interests.11 In the 
Doha Round, the WTO had expected to conclude an international FDI treaty, but 
this effort failed when the Doha Round collapsed in the mid-2000s.12 Among the 
 
 8 See Matthew C. Porterfield, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 1, 3 (2015). 
 9 The application of realpolitik to the realm of international trade and investment laws 
inform and nuance many of the arguments advanced in this Note. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER, 
DIPLOMACY 832 (1994) (“If the principles of the [WTO] in fact prevail, the Western Hemi-
sphere will be a major participant in global economic growth. If discriminatory regional group-
ings dominate, the Western Hemisphere, with its vast market, will be able to compete effec-
tively . . . . In a world where America is often obliged to strike a balance between its values 
and its necessities, it has discovered that its ideals and its geopolitical objectives mesh sub-
stantially.”); GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
SINCE 1776, at 926 (2008) (“[i]n embassies across the world, diplomats turned their attention 
to economics” as the Cold War ended, NAFTA was passed, and the WTO emerged). 
 10 DAVID A. GANTZ, LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL, 
PLURILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVES 28, 34 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 33–36. 
 12 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶¶ 20–22, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). The WTO dropped these efforts as 
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reasons proffered to explain the failure of the Doha Round, scholars point to: 
divergence in the objectives of developing states, the fear of Chinese economic 
growth, lack of political will, the expansion of government regulation of climate 
change, and the lack of strong support from business stakeholders.13 With regard 
to the lack of support from business stakeholders, the business stakeholders 
wanted reforms in services, investment, and e-commerce, while the WTO and 
other political stakeholders focused on tariff and non-tariff barrier reduction.14 
From the ashes of WTO-led negotiations, bilateral (e.g., BITs)15 and plurilat-
eral (e.g., NAFTA, USMCA) preferential trade agreements on more limited is-
sues emerged, backed by global business interests.16 While these agreements 
more immediately addressed the needs of the business community, they created 
a complex patchwork of inconsistent protections, obligations, and other regula-
tions.17 While some commentators and academics retained hope in the early-
2010s that there would be a multilateral solution to the problem of FDI regula-
tion,18 mid-decade shifts in political mores made this increasingly unlikely. 
 
early as 2004, suggesting that, had the Doha Round proceeded further, a multilateral invest-
ment treaty or protocol would not have been in the final agreements. See The Doha Declara-
tion Explained, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaex-
plained_e.htm#investment (last visited Feb. 11, 2021). It is reasonable to assume that such an 
agreement would follow the course of other attempted multilateral investment frameworks and 
end without a deal. See Trishna Menon & Gladwin Isaac, Developing Country Opposition to 
an Investment Court: Could State-State Dispute Settlement be an Alternative?, WOLTERS 
KLUWER: KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 17, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitra-
tion.com/2018/02/17/developing-country-opposition-investment-court-state-state-dispute-
settlement-alternative/; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, at 7, OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998) (embodying a draft document for a multilateral FDI 
treaty prepared for the failed Seattle Round). 
 13 GANTZ, supra note 10, at 38–44. 
 14 Id. at 41–43; see also Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Talks Crashed When 
Developing Nations Balked at Taking Up Some ‘Singapore Issues’, INT’L TRADE REP. (Sept. 
18, 2003) (reporting out failure of the WTO conference appeared to stem from unwillingness 
of developing countries to “move away from agricultural issues to the so-called Singapore 
issues”). 
 15 See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 14 (quoting Frank Vargo, former U.S. government 
official and then-National Association of Manufacturers’ Vice President for International Eco-
nomic Affairs: “I wouldn’t be surprised if [the United States] puts much more emphasis on 
bilateral trade talks without giving up on the WTO.”). 
 16 Andrew L. Stoler, Addressing 21st Century “WTO-Plus” Issues in the Multilateral 
Trading System, in THE FUTURE AND THE WTO: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGES 42 (Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann & Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza eds., July 2012), 
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/79786/mod_resource/content/1/the-future-and-the-
wto-confronting-the-challenges.pdf. 
 17 Id. at 44. 
 18 See, e.g., id. 
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While the collapse of the Doha Round created the legal backdrop for FDI and 
BIT reform, the political will for this reform stems from policies associated with 
the candidacy and election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency. During the 
2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump and his advisors made largely 
protectionist economic promises.19 In May 2016, then-Trump supporter and 
later-Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross expressed concerns about the rising 
economic power of China and its state-controlled debt and currency markets.20 
As the election progressed, investors began to fear major drops in Asian stocks 
following a Trump victory, citing as an important factor “‘unpredictable’ foreign 
policy” that may produce beneficial individual outcomes through negotiation but 
would aggregate into substantial losses or underperformance across Asia.21 Cam-
paign bluster quickly turned into action after inauguration, with Trump taking 
executive action to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship and reorienting U.S. international trade and investment policy.22   
World leaders prepared for a vacuum in global political leadership as soon as 
President Trump was elected.23 Under the Trump Administration, U.S. strategy 
shifted towards using bilateral pacts with individual states and unilateral tariffs 
to effect Trump’s trade, investment, and foreign policy objectives, harnessing the 
United States’ strategic and economic heft to prevent concessions granted during 
earlier plurilateral and multilateral negotiations.24 By mid-2017, these tactics 
 
 19 Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Says He Favors Big Tariffs on Chinese Exports, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-
draft/2016/01/07/donald-trump-says-he-favors-big-tariffs-on-chinese-exports/. 
 20 Dimitra DeFotis, Q&A: Wilbur Ross on China, Yuan, Debt & Trump, BARRON’S (May 
25, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/q-a-wilbur-ross-on-china-yuan-debt-
trump-1464184849. 
 21 Nomura, What a Trump Presidency Means for Asian Stocks, BARRON’S (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/what-a-trump-presidency-means-for-asian-stocks-
1469502034. 
 22 Jack Caporal, Trump Takes Executive Action Withdrawing U.S. from TPP, Collapsing 
Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE’S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:03 PM), https://in-
sidetrade.com/daily-news/trump-takes-executive-action-withdrawing-us-tpp-collapsing-deal. 
 23 See Zachary Burdette, Today’s Headlines and Commentary, LAWFARE: HARD NAT’L 
SEC. CHOICES (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/todays-headlines-and-
commentary-1186 (summarizing the reactions to Trump’s election by international leaders as 
reported in major news outlets the day after the U.S. election); see also Across the World, 
Shock and Uncertainty at Trump’s Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.c 
om/2016/11/09/world/europe/global-reaction-us-presidential-election-donald-trump.html (re-
porting economic concerns in China and Mexico); Santiago Pérez & José de Córdoba, Donald 
Trump’s Win Goes Down Hard in Mexico: Country Scrambles to Shore Up Support for Peso 
As Its Frequent Attacker Secures the U.S. Presidency, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-win-goes-down-hard-in-mexico-1478678362 
(reporting the weakening of the Peso in after-hours trading due to the election and the precar-
ious position of Mexican fiscal policy). 
 24 William Mauldin, Trump’s Big Gamble: Luring Countries Into One-on-One Trade 
Deals, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-big-
2021] EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION REFORM 377 
launched a “trade war” between the United States and China that forms the back-
drop to the topic of this Note.25 
Political disruption from this shift spurred a cascade of new BIT negotiations, 
giving states and political actors an opportunity to revisit the legal underpinnings 
of the international investment system.26 As states faced new political and diplo-
matic tensions caused by such adjustments, business stakeholders similarly faced 
new legal and economic challenges. Business interests globally faced populist 
pressure to consider a broader range of stakeholders when making business de-
cisions, driving business leaders to pledge to take increased responsibility for the 
public good.27 Additionally, governments considered new regulations on tech-
nology, energy, and other sectors of the economy, further disrupting traditional 
business activities.28 This panoply of economic and political forces drove actors’ 
interests in and commitment to the international trade and investment negotia-
tions in the late-2010s, and the BITs’ efficacy must be evaluated in light of those 
commitments. 
 
gamble-luring-countries-into-one-on-one-trade-deals-1485483628. Shortly before the elec-
tion, key Trump advisors outlined Trump’s Asia strategy, which comprised both prioritizing 
U.S. economic clout over foreign policy goals and bolstering military presence in the region 
to enforce peace. Alexander Gray & Peter Navarro, Donald Trump’s Peace Through Strength 
Vision for the Asia-Pacific, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 7, 2016, 2:14 PM), https://foreignpol-
icy.com/2016/11/07/donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific/. 
 25 See Dan Burns, Jonas Ekblom, & Andrea Shalal, Timeline: Key Dates in the U.S.-China 
Trade War, REUTERS (Sep. 5, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-
china-timeline/timeline-key-dates-in-the-us-china-trade-war-idUSKCN1VQ24Y (summariz-
ing key events that escalated international trade tensions in 2017). 
 26 Daniel C.K. Chow et al., The Revival of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading 
System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2166–67 (2019) (discussing the role of economic protec-
tionism in FDI regulation in the late-2010s). 
 27 See Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statement-on-
the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures-1.pdf (pledging to commit to the wellbeing of 
“all” stakeholders); Nicholas Lemann, When Corporations Changed their Social Role—and 
Upended Our Politics, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/when-corporations-changed-their-social-roleand-upended-our-politics-11567782178. 
But see Richard J. Shinder, Opinion, The Business Roundtable’s Recipe for Confusion: When 
Companies Try to Do the Government’s Job, Inefficiency and Uncertainty Result, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-business-roundtables-recipe-
for-confusion-11568760132?mod=hp_opin_pos_2 (arguing that putting anyone over share-
holders is a costly mistake). 
 28 See, e.g., Frank Ready, Facing Regulation Tech Companies are Rolling the Dice with 
Self-Regulation, LAW.COM: LEGALTECH NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.law.com/legal-
technews/2019/09/27/facing-legislation-tech-companies-are-rolling-the-dice-with-self-regu-
lation/. 
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B. The Rule of Local Remedies 
 
Unless abrogated by a BIT, the Rule of Local Remedies (the RLR) is the de-
fault customary rule of international law that controls whether a foreign investor 
can seek remedies from an international tribunal for claims arising out of FDI. 
The RLR requires claimants for international or treaty wrongs to vindicate their 
rights in domestic tribunals before seeking a remedy in an international tribu-
nal.29 The International Court of Justice recognized this customary doctrine in 
the Interhandel case, noting that “[b]efore resort may be had to an international 
court . . . it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation oc-
curred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the 
framework of its own domestic legal system.”30 While it originated in the context 
of diplomatic protection of aliens, the RLR took on a role in additional areas of 
international dispute.31 
There are two fundamental views on the RLR. One view would give the RLR 
substantive weight, requiring that a claimant show exhaustion of local remedies 
before bringing a claim to an international tribunal.32 The other view character-
izes the RLR as being merely procedural, allowing the respondent state the op-
portunity to adjudicate the claim in its domestic courts but not requiring exhaus-
tion as part of the international cause of action.33 
The RLR “is founded on the principal premise that the host or respondent state 
must be given the opportunity of redressing the alleged injury, to an alien or 
individual, which constitutes an international wrong.”34 The RLR emerged out 
of the recognition of the sovereignty interests of the respondent state.35 However, 
as the RLR was developed in its application, it was “influenced and somewhat 
modified by the consideration of interests other than those of the host or respond-
ent state, and particularly by taking into account the position of the alien or of 
the individual in the settlement of what may be regarded as an international dis-
pute.”36 
 
 29 CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 
(2d ed. 2004). 
 30 Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21). 
 31 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 35–42 (summarizing the development of the Rule in 
the twentieth century outside of diplomatic protection contexts into human rights, agreements 
between international organizations and states, and FDI). 
 32 Id. at 391. 
 33 Id. at 388. 
 34 Id. at 13. 
 35 Id. at 58. 
 36 Id. at 13. 
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Among scholars, the majority view is that the RLR is a procedural rule.37 This 
characterization of the RLR relies heavily upon the balancing of interests pro-
tected by the RLR between the sovereignty interests of the state and the funda-
mental fairness to the individual claimant, and any application of the RLR must 
be based upon a choice among the competing interests that it protects.38 A con-
sequence of a procedural character for the RLR may be that international adju-
dicatory bodies would be more willing to waive the RLR or apply a good faith 
or estoppel doctrine to its invocation.39 
A minority view among scholars and international adjudicatory bodies is that 
the RLR represents a substantive requirement of seeking relief for an interna-
tional wrong.40 Under this theory, a potential international claim becomes justi-
ciable at the international level only after the respondent state denies a remedy 
for the underlying internationally illegal act.41 This theory of the RLR places 
much greater emphasis on the sovereignty interests of the respondent state and 
would not balance that interest against the interests of the claimants.42 This the-
ory more strongly protects the respondent state. 
In the context of ISDS, categorization of the RLR as procedural or substantive 
will influence decisions of international tribunals to either bypass or uphold ex-
haustion requirements. As BITs developed in the late twentieth century, they 
tended to waive the RLR because of the belief held by mostly developed coun-
tries that the administration of justice and legal systems in predominantly devel-
oping countries was prejudiced against foreign interests.43 As this Note will 
 
 37 Id. at 416 (“This survey of what courts, tribunals and judges have done when faced with 
an objection that local remedies had not been exhausted shows that the evidence conclusively 
favours the view that the rule of local remedies is procedural and neither substantive nor a 
combination of the two. Judges or states may have made statements supporting the view that 
the rule is substantive, but the practice of judicial bodies relating to the rule leads overwhelm-
ingly to the conclusion that the rule has not been treated as substantive or as both substantive 
and procedural but as solely procedural in character.”); see also George K. Foster, Striking a 
Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local 
Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 201, 210 (2011) 
(“Most modern authorities describe the exhaustion of local remedies rule as procedural in na-
ture, because it has the effect of barring the admissibility of a claim even if it is valid on the 
merits.”). 
 38 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 62–64. 
 39 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 400–02. See also NOAH RUBINS, THOMAS-NEKTARIOS 
PAPANASTASIOU & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK, AND 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 311–12 (2d ed. 2020) (in practice, the Rule 
embodies a requirement of jurisdiction rather than substance). 
 40 Id. at 389. Foster, supra note 37, at 238–43 (recognizing that some specific claims aris-
ing under a BIT may require a showing that local remedies were exhausted or were inadequate 
as part of the merits of that claim). 
 41 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 391. 
 42 Id. at 397. 
 43 Id. at 41. 
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explore, beginning in the mid-2010s, states reconsidered the policy implications 
of waiver of the RLR in BIT negotiations. Examining a sampling of the BITs 
negotiated in the late-2010s, many states attempted to reimpose the RLR, reflect-
ing a stronger policy preference toward the host states’ sovereignty interest.  
However, other doctrines and litigation tactics that developed among practition-
ers and the arbitral panels impose uncertainty on the ultimate efficacy of these 
more recent BITs that reimpose the RLR.   
 
II. BITS STATUS QUO 
 
A. Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Forces Guiding BITs from 1994 to 2015 
 
Prior to the failure of the Doha Round of the WTO in the mid-2000s, liberali-
zation of trade and increasing globalization were important factors in the devel-
opment of international trade law.44 These narratives also impacted the develop-
ment of international investment law and BIT negotiations. Modern BITs 
originated in the 1950s and 1960s largely between developed Western European 
countries and developing countries. These early BITs heavily favored the devel-
oped countries from which the FDI originated, a trend that continued through to 
BITs negotiated after the Uruguay Round.45 Some governments saw BITs as 
providing much-needed clarity to the largely unregulated sphere of international 
investment law.46 Other governments, particularly those of developing states, as-
sociated signing BITs with foreign investment flowing into their countries.47 
However, empirical studies suggest a lack of any connection between BITs and 
the flow of foreign direct investment.48   
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations in 1994, the 
BIT regime expanded.49 While each BIT is unique in some way, negotiations 
generally begin with a model BIT proffered by a developed nation to use as a 
 
 44 GANTZ, supra note 10, at 16–26. 
 45 MARIA A. GWYNN, POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK 47 (2016). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 127–35; see also Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties 2 (Yale L. Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y, Research Paper No. 293, 
2005) (finding a very weak relationship between BITs and FDI). 
 49 See BITs 1995–2006, supra note 6, at 143. 
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template.50 The use of templates results in BITs that, while not identical, contain 
extremely similar language and terms.51 
Due to the imbalance of bargaining power between developed states and de-
veloping states,52 most of the treaties entered into immediately after the Uruguay 
Round slanted power towards the developed states.53 This was in part because of 
the ISDS international arbitration provisions.54 Contrary to the customary RLR, 
international arbitration became a primary rather than a subsidiary means of ad-
judicating disputes, with very few BITs including strict exhaustion require-
ments.55 Many BITs gave the investors the right to initially choose between dif-
ferent dispute resolution regimes and then be bound to their choice, in what are 
known as “fork-in-the-road” clauses.56 Other BITs gave the investors unequivo-
cal access to international arbitration.57 A handful created unique arbitral systems 





 50 Id. at 91. 
 51 Id. at 91–92. 
 52 See generally GWYNN, supra note 45, at 43–83 (surveying historical BITs and the power 
struggle between developed and developing countries). 
 53 Id. at 117–18. 
 54 Id. at 117. 
 55 BITs 1995-2006, supra note 6, at 108. 
 56 See, e.g., 2008 Austrian Model BIT, art. 14(1), in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 39 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES]; Chinese 
Model BIT, art. 9(2), in COMMENTARIES at 172; Colombian 2009 Model IIA, art. IX.7, in 
COMMENTARIES, supra, at 231; Switzerland–Cambodia BIT, art. 11(4), in COMMENTARIES, 
supra, at 692 n.316; cf. 2003 Italian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. X(3), in 
COMMENTARIES 340–41 (embodying a fork-in-the-road provision that is not “strict” because 
the options “do not seem to be exclusive”); UK Model IPPA (2008), art. 8, in COMMENTARIES, 
supra, at 743–44 (providing a “Preferred” and an “Alternative” option). Many of these and 
other treaties are not titled as a “Bilateral Investment Treaty”; however, they all deal with the 
regulation of FDI and unless placed within the context of a larger economic treaty such as 
NAFTA are collectively referred to as BITs. 
 57 See, e.g., Canadian Model FIPA, art. 26, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 108; 
German Model BIT (2009), art. 10, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 316–17; Netherlands’ 
Model Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2004), art. 9, 
in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 580; Singapore Present IGA, art. 13(2), in 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 644; United States 2012 Model BIT, art. 24, in 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 821–22. 
 58 See, e.g., Latvia Model BIT, art. 10, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 56, at 456–58 (set-
ting out rules for arbitral tribunal creation); NAFTA Chapter 11, art. 1116, in COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 56, at 500. 
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B. Policy Interests at Stake 
 
i. Economic Protectionism 
 
The return of economic protectionism as a legitimate policy objective marks 
a major policy change in BITs negotiated in the late-2010s.59 Before the election 
of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency legitimized economic protectionism as 
a policy choice in international economic law, states and commentators ex-
pressed wariness toward ISDS arbitral tribunals convened by private parties with 
the power to disrupt domestic regulatory systems.60 Some advocated a resurrec-
tion of the RLR in the realm of the ISDS to avoid this critique.61 Economic pro-
tectionism is the preeminent driving force in the movement towards the resurrec-
tion of the RLR. However, other more nuanced concerns of both policy and 
business leaders that emerged during the failure of the Doha negotiations also 
influence the round of BITs renegotiations that emerged in the second half of the 
2010s. 
 
ii. Legitimacy Crisis 
 
A legitimacy crisis, real or perceived, of the ISDS system also influences the 
BIT negotiations. At the beginning of the 2010s, scholars of the international 
trade and investment regime came together to criticize the ISDS system on a 
number of grounds.62 While recognizing that “[a]ll investors . . . should have 
 
 59 See supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and Dic-
ing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 355, 382 (2017) (“[Investor–state dis-
pute settlement] allows foreign corporations to interfere with the host government’s ability to 
regulate, constraining the state’s capacity to function for the benefit of the public.”); Stephan 
W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of 
Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 578 (2012) (collecting criticisms regarding inves-
tor-state dispute settlement as “intrud[ing] into the regulatory space of host states”); George 
K. Foster, Investor-Community Conflicts in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Rethinking 
“Reasonable Expectations” and Expecting More from Investors, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 105, 108 
n.3 (2019) (collecting “Community Conflict Cases” where foreign investors have sought dam-
ages through international arbitration for the cancellation of development projects after com-
munity backlash due to water contamination, destruction of sacred sites, or endangerment of 
plants or wildlife). 
 61 See, e.g., Porterfield, supra note 8, at 1–3. 
 62 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. 
(Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-
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access to an open and independent judicial system,” the scholars wanted to bal-
ance this interest with an understanding that international arbitration for ISDS 
settlement was “a means to the end of advancing the public welfare and must not 
be treated as an end in itself.”63 These scholars perceived that the ISDS system 
favored too heavily the protection of investors and undermined the states’ fun-
damental rights.64 Specifically, they argued that the ISDS system needed to be-
come more transparent and that investment contracts needed to be “concluded 
and implemented in accordance with the principles of public accountability and 
openness and should preserve the state’s right to regulate in good faith and for a 
legitimate purpose.”65   
Arbitrators who sit on these ISDS arbitral tribunals likewise face key questions 
that lead to issues of legitimacy. Greater generality and ambiguity of BITs and 
other international agreements lead to more judicial discretion, which affects the 
rights and obligations of the states.66 However, the arbitrators themselves may 
prefer restraint in their pronouncements, to either the chagrin or benefit of the 
states or parties involved, because of the inherent uncertainty and discretion in-
herent in certain areas of international law.67   
At least one commentator suggests that a solution to this legitimacy crisis is 
increased diplomatic discourse and negotiations as a means of dispute settlement, 
both through formal mechanisms in the provisions of BITs and informally 
though other channels and mechanisms.68 While this system may greatly appeal 
to states, investors fear the efficacy of these systems to properly protect their 
reliance interest as such systems restrict investors’ ability to vindicate their rights 
under BITs.69 
 
regime-31-august-2010/. These legitimacy questions are not new. In 1988, the late Professor 
Philippe Fouchard lamented the plague of misconduct and procedural disputes that character-
ized the field of international arbitration. Phillippe Fouchard, Où va l’arbitrage international? 
[Where Is International Arbitration Going?], 34 MCGILL L.J. 435, 450 (1989). 
 63 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, supra note 62. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 9 (2012) (citing Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of Interna-
tional Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 377, 
389 (1976)). International arbitral bodies do not have a rule of stare decisis as Anglo-American 
courts do. Instead, the strength of prior international decisions is generally assessed by the 
persuasiveness of their justification. Instead, future international tribunals have discretion to 
rely on the logical justifications, policy considerations, or even the members of previous pan-
els in making decisions. Id. at 11. 
 67 Id. at 19. 
 68 Matilde Recanati, Diplomatic Intervention and State-to-State Arbitration As an Alter-
native Means for the Protection of Foreign Investments and Host States’ General Interests: 
The Italian Experience, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOSTS STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 422, 424 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014). 
 69 See infra Part IV. 
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At the beginning of the 2010s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) suggested model clauses for BIT dispute resolution 
procedures as a solution to the legitimacy crisis.70 UNCTAD explored increasing 
opportunities for amicable or diplomatic resolution and promoting alternative 
dispute resolution.71 However, UNCTAD strongly advocated the return to view-
ing international resolution as an extraordinary measure by reasserting the im-
portance of the RLR.72 Specifically, UNCTAD suggested that state parties 
should convert “fork-in-the-road” treaty provisions into “no-U-turn” clauses and 
toll statutes of limitations while investors exhaust their claims in local courts.73 
 
iii. Fair and Equitable Treatment—Reliance Interests and Legitimate 
Expectations 
 
The “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (FET) clause that is a standard term in 
most BITs, also known as the “International Minimum Standard,” provides an-
other important policy interest in negotiating BITs.74 Policymakers, scholars, and 
international tribunals often disagree regarding the scope of this term and its ap-
plication to ISDS.75 Textually, FET clauses provide a balancing test, weighing 
fairness toward the investor with a rule of law principle and interacting with the 
particular interests and expectations of foreign investors.76 Arbitration panels 
must interpret these provisions on a case-by-case basis, defining the normative 
content of the standard in the context of individual treatments.77   
In tackling the FET balancing standard, arbitration panels point to interests 
such as: Protection of the “basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment”; the expectation that “the host State . . . 
act in a consistent manner”; and the expectation that “the State . . . use the legal 
 
 70 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2 (Dec. 2013), at 173–91. 
 71 Id. at 175–76, 195–97. 
 72 Id. at 177–78. 
 73 Id. at 178. 
 74 As reflected in BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, there is a dispute among practitioners 
as to whether FET provisions equate to the American concept of due process of law, but schol-
ars and commentators generally consider “Fair and Equitable Treatment” provisions, custom-
ary “International Minimum Standard,” and the conceptual term “due process of law” to be 
related. See Mara Valenti, The Protection of the General Interests of Host States in the Appli-
cation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOSTS STATES 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 26, 29–32 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014). 
 75 See id. at 54–56. 
 76 Id. at 34–35 (citing DOMINIQUE CARREAU & PATRICK JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
ÉCONOMIQUE 463 (2007)). 
 77 Id. at 35–38. 
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instruments . . . in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instru-
ments.”78 Panels focus heavily on the concept of “legitimate reasonable expecta-
tions” as well as the stability, consistency, predictability, and transparency of the 
regulatory framework.79 When addressing claims under FET standards, the arbi-
tral tribunals ultimately weigh the “State’s legitimate right to regulate the rele-
vant economic sector [against] the behaviour taken by the foreign investor it-
self.”80 
Unresolved in FET arbitration is whether the protections of the FET standard 
extend to procedural rules of ISDS. Some panels have interpreted FET standards 
to allow a claim notwithstanding exhaustion requirements because of a breach of 
notions of due process.81 In Lemire v. Ukraine, an arbitration arising out of an 
allegedly unfair administrative procedure toward the foreign investor, the panel 
allowed a  FET claim even though the complaining foreign investor had not pur-
sued available local judicial remedies.82 The panel interpreted the applicable FET 
clause as a balancing test that required only reasonableness in the claimants de-
cision not to pursue local remedies weighed against the state’s sovereignty inter-
ests and the investor’s other legitimate expectation.83 Ultimately in that arbitra-
tion, the panel concluded that there was inequitable treatment toward the foreign 
investor under the FET standard in the administrative regulation and licensing of 
radio frequencies.84 
While the reasoning and persuasiveness of Lemire is uncertain, policy con-
cerns advocate extending the protections of FET provisions to cover procedural 
interests so that the FET provisions impose substantive requirements on the ISDS 
procedure. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT implicated such policy concerns when it 
obliged procedural rules “not to deny justice . . . in accordance with the principle 
of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”85 These 
due process standards often include substantive requirements for procedure on 
top of purely procedural protections.86 
 
 78 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004). 
 79 See Valenti, supra note 74, at 39–40. 
 80 Id. at 52. 
 81 See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability (Jan. 14, 2010). 
 82 Id. ¶ 277. 
 83 Id. ¶¶ 282, 284–85. 
 84 Id. ¶¶ 419–21. A factor that seemed to weigh heavily on the panel’s decision was the 
opaqueness of the administrative law principles at work in the circumstances that led to the 
controversy before the panel. See id. ¶¶ 293–317. 
 85 2004 U.S. Model BIT, art. 5.2(a), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Sectors/ 
Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 86 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (declaring that due pro-
cess requires that procedure “not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice”). 
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The FET standard may also incorporate the idea that investment treaties and 
their dispute settlement mechanisms should “give legal protection to the inves-
tor’s expectations created by the host state’s representation or conduct.”87 While 
arbitration panels often apply an equitable view of protection to the “legitimate 
reasonable expectations” of the investors, the panels have not applied such a view 
consistently.88 
Another conceptualization of the FET standard suggests that it protects reli-
ance interests in the international investment regime by functioning in a promis-
sory estoppel-type manner.89 While the proposal does not address the substantive 
goal of furthering development through international investment law, it presents 
an interesting argument for rethinking remedies under international trade law, 
suggesting that remedies should protect reliance-based interests rather than ex-
pectancy-based interests.90 Under this theory, the protected interest is only the 
investment  rather than including its potential profits, shifting risk from the host 
country to the investor in any particular investment.91 
When addressing the issues within the investor-state dispute settlement re-
gime, drafters, statesmen, and other practitioners must consider, consistent with 
the developed FET jurisprudence, the fairness upon which investors rely when 
making private investment decisions. The promissory estoppel-like reliance the-
ory of the FET standard is an explicit recognition of the importance of the reli-
ance interests that investors hold in the international investment regime. Resort 
to investor-state dispute settlement in the form of international arbitration encap-
sules part of that reliance interest, although the perceived benefits of international 
arbitration may stem from deeply rooted biases.92 Removal of procedural rights 
that investors perceive as preferable may undermine the whole international in-
vestment system and the reliance interest implicit in the FET standard.   
 
 87 TEERAWAT WONGKAEW, PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION: A THEORY OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 3 (2019). 
 88 See generally id.; see also Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.75 (Nov. 30, 2012) 
(protecting legitimate reasonable expectations is the “most important function of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard”); Int’l Thunderbird Gaming v. United Mexican States, Separate 
Opinion of Thomas Wälde, ¶ 37 (Dec. 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0432.pdf (finding “a self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a 
claim [based upon a theory of detrimental reliance upon reasonable expectations] under the 
‘fair and equitable standard’”). 
 89 See generally WONGKAEW, supra note 87. 
 90 Id. at 233–64. 
 91 Id. at 264. 
 92 See AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 41–42 (suggesting that while developing states 
have legitimate reasons to disfavor waiver of the Rule of Local Remedies, investors from de-
veloped states will consider international arbitration more favorable because of the sophisti-
cation of the arbitrators appointed and a forum that has intrinsic biases towards themselves). 
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III. EXAMINATION OF BITS 
 
This Note examines a sample of BITs and sorts them into general categories 
to discuss the structure of their dispute settlement clauses and their implications 
with regard to the changing role of the RLR and exhaustion. Unfortunately, very 
few claims have come before an arbitration panel arising under BITs negotiated 
in the late-2010s, such that no panel has analyzed these dispute settlement 
clauses. Their contrasting textual language, though, implicates divergent inter-
ests that inform a normative assessment of these BITs. 
  Perhaps more interesting than the contrasts between different states’ agree-
ments are internal inconsistencies, where individual states agreed to differing 
obligations in different BITs. In this sampling for example, the UAE agreed to 
BITs with the traditional “fork-in-the-road” provision, a limited “fork-in-the-
road” provision, automatic international arbitration, and a treaty-established tri-
bunal.93 These inconsistencies alone may indicate a structural policy issue with 
increasingly individualized BITs. The failure to establish a multilateral solution 
to issues in international investment law led to a sometimes-inconsistent patch-
work of BITs, straining the international arbitration infrastructure to establish 
policy solutions.94   
In light of the policy issues discussed above, these inconsistencies undermine 
the policy aims of reformers, potentially introducing more distrust of the inter-
national law system, apprehension from investors, and inequitable treatment be-
tween states.   
 
 
 93 Compare Acuerdo Entre Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y La República Oriental Del 
Uruguay para La Promoción y Protección Recíprocas de Inversiones, U.A.E.-Uru., art. 11(4), 
Oct. 24, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agree-
ments/treaty-files/5813/download [hereinafter UAE-Uruguay BIT], with Agreement Between 
Japan and the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-
U.A.E., Apr. 30, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agree-
ments/treaty-files/5741/download [hereinafter Japan-UAE BIT], and Agreement Between the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, art. 8(5), H.K.-U.A.E., June 16, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5865/download [hereinafter Hong Kong-UAE BIT], and Cooperation and Facilitation 
Investment Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emir-
ates, art. 1, Braz.-U.A.E., Mar. 15, 2019, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-in-
vestment-agreements/treaty-files/5855/download [hereinafter Brazil-UAE BIT]. 
 94 See Stoler, supra note 16. 
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A. Extreme Exhaustion Requirements 
 
Treaties based upon the 2016 India Model BIT generated the most discussion 
in the BIT negotiations of the late-2010s because they impose a strict exhaustion 
requirement for dispute resolution in local courts.95 While India’s previous 
model BIT contained a typical “fork-in-the-road” provision,96 the new model 
BIT requires complete exhaustion of local remedies before an international arbi-
tration panel may hear an investor’s dispute.97 Prior to adopting this model BIT, 
India had been served numerous notices for international arbitration of ISDS af-
ter a foreign corporation won an arbitration award relying on a term of one Indian 
BIT that promised “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.”98 
India’s narrowing of international arbitration is, in many respects, a reaction to 
this explosion of arbitration.99 Concluded BITs include this provision. For exam-
ple, the Belarus-India BIT adopts a strict five-year exhaustion requirement, 
which, while not indefinite as in the model BIT, is effectively indefinite.100 
India’s model BIT generated much debate, with commentators expressing 
skepticism about the exhaustion requirements. Brookings India released a re-
sponsive report on the developments in India’s international trade and investment 
policy, with the subtitle questioning “Is India Too Risk Averse?”101 Some com-
mentators suggested that the document does not truly cure the issues India sought 
to address, as indicated and compared to a March 2015 draft model BIT which 
had included obligations on investors to comply with host state laws, 
 
 95 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2016), art. 14.3,  
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_im-
age/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf 
[hereinafter 2016 India Model BIT]. 
 96 Indian Model Text of BIPA (2003), art. 9(2), https://www.italaw.com/sites/de-
fault/files/archive/ita1026.pdf. 
 97 2016 India Model BIT, supra note 95. 
 98 See White Indus. Austr. v. Republic of India, Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0906.pdf; see also PRABHASH 
RANJAN ET AL., INDIA’S MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: IS INDIA TOO RISK AVERSE? 
8–9 (2018) (summarizing India’s backlash against BITs and investor-state dispute settlement 
generally). 
 99 RANJAN, supra note 98, at 8–9. The Model BIT also narrows other traditional BIT terms 
such as the FET standard and the Most-Favored Nation provisions. Id. at 20–28. Circumscrib-
ing the FET standard may push the India BIT beyond the pale for investors or even state part-
ners who might fear rampant protectionism or could push international arbitration panels to 
craft a customary solution notwithstanding the plain meaning of the text. 
 100 Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of India on Investments, 
Belr.-India, art. 15.2, Sep. 24, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5724/do 
wnload. 
 101 RANJAN, supra note 98, at 1. 
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transparency and anti-corruption standards, and imposed severe consequences 
for breach of those obligations.102 The March 2015 draft had also included sev-
eral provisions protecting the host state’s regulatory space and broadened some 
exceptions to the BIT.103 These provisions sought to cure the issues identified 
over the course of the White Industries and subsequent  international arbitration.   
Others commented upon the inability of India to disengage from the ISDS 
system, despite the new model BIT significantly altering the terms of India’s 
engagement.104 Still other industry professionals and commentators noted that 
this model BIT and India’s foreign investment policy lacked a “robust framework 
for protection of investors and investments.”105 They indicated desire for more 
fundamental change: “What India awaits is a legal and regulatory framework that 
is not adversarial or difficult for the foreign investor but instills confidence and 
faith in order to nurture smooth and beneficial economic relationships towards 
effective and sustainable development of both – the foreign investor and the Re-
public of India.”106 
While this extreme form of the exhaustion requirement does protect the sov-
ereignty interest and expands the state’s ability to regulate FDI, commentators’ 
reactions indicate that such requirements scare investors. This alone undermines 
the efficacy of BITs with strict exhaustion requirements in encouraging invest-
ments. 
 
B. Traditional Fork-in-the-Road 
 
Some states chose to retain the traditional “fork-in-the-road” dispute settle-
ment provisions, giving potential litigants the choice of fora.107 The pertinent 
provisions of these BITs do not vary significantly from the older BITs that 
 
 102 Jesse Coleman & Kanika Gupta, India’s Revised Model BIT: Two Steps Forward, One 
Step Back?, OXFORD L. CTR.: INV. CLAIMS (Oct. 4, 2017), https://oxia.ouplaw.com/page/631. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Ranjan, supra note 98, at 38. 
 105 NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INDIA: 
WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON INDIA MODEL BIT, 2016 51 (Feb. 2018), 
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research_Papers/Bilateral_Invest 
ment_Treaty_Arbitration_and_India-PRINT-2.pdf. 
 106 Id. at 51. 
 107 See, e.g., Agreement Between Australia and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Uru., art. 14(5), Apr. 5, 2019, https://invest-
mentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5853/download 
[hereinafter Australia-Uruguay BIT]; UAE-Uruguay BIT, supra note 93, at art. 11(4); Accord 
Entre le Gouvernement de la Republique du Mali et le Gouvernement de la Republique de 
Turquie Relatif a la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements, Mali-Turk., 
art. 10(2), Mar. 2, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agree-
ments/treaty-files/5740/download [hereinafter Mali-Turkey BIT]. 
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contained these provisions.108 This model allows the foreign investor to retain 
significant control over the ISDS process. In many ways, this bucks against the 
interests driving the current round of BIT renegotiations. Perhaps, though, this 
model demonstrates a pragmatic understanding of the limitations of many fea-
tures present in the system designed to protect host state interests.109 
 
C. Fork-in-the-Road with Limitations 
 
As discussed above, a traditional “fork-in-the-road” clause allows investors to 
choose the body that will adjudicate disputes arising under the given BIT. The 
choice an investor makes may or may not be binding and limit their ability to 
bring disputes before alternative bodies. In BIT negotiations in the late-2010s, 
some states limited traditional “fork-in-the-road” provisions by only allowing 
international tribunals to exercise limited subject matter jurisdiction.110 
One exemplar agreement, the Indonesia-Australia BIT, strongly prefers reso-
lution in Indonesia’s domestic courts if Indonesia is the disputing Party.111 The 
Turkey-Cambodia BIT only allows investment activities that received the per-
mission of the Turkey legislature to initiate international arbitration, and the 
 
 108 Compare, e.g., Australia-Uruguay BIT, supra note 107, at art. 14(5) (“A claimant may 
submit a claim . . . under one of the following alternatives: (a) to a competent court of the 
Party in whose territory the investment is made . . .  or (b) the ICSID Convention . . .  or (c) 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules . . .  or (d) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or (e) by 
agreement, to any other arbitral institution or any other arbitration rules.”), with, e.g., 2008 
Austrian Model BIT, supra note 56, at art. 14 (allowing investors to submit claims to a com-
petent court of the party, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure, the ICSID, under 
UNCITRAL, or to the ICC). This provides an example of continuity among BITs negotiated 
after the Uruguay Round and BITs negotiated in the late-2010s. 
 109 See infra Part IV. 
 110 See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 
Austl.-Indon., at ch. 14, Feb. 6, 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/iacepa-chap-
ter-14-investment.pdf [hereinafter Indonesia-Australia BIT]; Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cambodia-Turk., Oct. 21, 2018, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5833/do 
wnload [hereinafter Turkey-Cambodia BIT]; Accord Entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du 
Maroc et le Gouvernement de la Republique du Congo sur la Promotion et la Protection Reci-
proques des Investissements, Congo-Morocco, Apr. 30, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unc-
tad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5809/download [hereinafter Mo-
rocco-Congo BIT]; Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93; Accord Relatif a la Promotion et la 
Protection Reciproques des Investissements Entre le Gouvernement de la Republique du Mali 
et Le Gouvernement des Emirats Arabes Unis, Mali-U.A.E., Mar. 6, 2018, https://investment-
policy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5770/download [hereinaf-
ter Mali-UAE BIT]. 
 111 Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.25(1)(a). 
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agreement excludes any dispute related to “property and real rights upon the real 
estates” from international arbitration.112 In the Morocco-Congo BIT, an investor 
cannot submit a dispute to international arbitration if it has been submitted to 
domestic courts and decided without significant delay.113 In the Japan-UAE BIT, 
a party may not “appeal” a final decision of a domestic court or administrative 
tribunal to an international arbitration panel.114 In the Mali-UAE BIT, a contract-
ing party—the state—may demand that domestic courts hear the investor-state 
dispute.115 
These deviate from earlier “fork-in-the-road” forum selection clauses by plac-
ing more control over the choice of arbitral forum in the hands of the host state. 
Many of these agreements also contain language to limit the effects of other doc-
trines on the area of dispute settlement, such as the incorporation of dispute res-
olution clauses from other BITs through a most-favored nation clause.116 
A dispute arising under these BITs may still attempt to reach an international 
tribunal through investor-state dispute resolution. The arbitral tribunal, if it ap-
plies a procedural theory of the RLR, may be more willing to waive the exhaus-
tion requirements that the state parties attempted to impose in these BITs.117 
However, these states have attempted to impose a stronger policy favoring sov-
ereignty in the very text of the BITs with respect to the RLR by, for example, 
excluding the application of the Most Favored Nations doctrine to forum choice 
and including political actors in the forum selection for investor-state dispute 
settlement. While some panels have followed these limitations on BITs,118 other 




 112 Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 9(4)(a)–(b). 
 113 Morocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 9(2)(c). 
 114 Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 17(5)(a). 
 115 Mali-UAE BIT, supra note 110, at art 11(3). 
 116 See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia BIT supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater certainty, 
the [Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision] shall not encompass international dispute res-
olution procedures . . . .”); Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(4)(c) (Most-Fa-
vored Nation treatment “shall not apply in respect of dispute settlement provisions”); Mo-
rocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(2) (stating that Most-Favored Nation treatment 
will not apply with respect to the right of an investor to submit a dispute to any other dispute 
settlement procedure”); Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(6) (Most-Favored Nation-
Treatment “does not include treatment accorded to investors of a non-Contracting party and 
their investments concerning the settlement of investment disputes”). 
 117 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 400–02. 
 118 See also ICS Inspection & Control Servs. v. Argentine Republic, PCA Case No. 2010-
9, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 243–73, 280 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0416.pdf (arbitral panel inter-
preting similar language in a BIT as a substantive limitation on a state’s consent to the panel’s 
jurisdiction). 
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D. No Exhaustion: Always Have the International Option 
 
Other states chose to retain a continuous option of international arbitration in 
their BITs, always allowing foreign investors to take disputes to the international 
level.119 These BITs, which have a strong default preference for international 
arbitration, may appeal more to the investor who wants the international option 
to vindicate his rights. This liberal grant of arbitral jurisdiction would provide 
more certainty as to where the disputes will end up in the investor-state dispute 
settlement regime. 
 
E. Treaty-Established Tribunal 
 
Other states established unique tribunal or arbitral systems through BITs.120 
These provisions allow states, in crafting their investment obligations, to tailor 
the scope of their international liability and exposure. These provisions also gen-
erally place the burden on the state parties to pursue international arbitration 
against their trading partners, rather than allowing foreign investors—private 
parties—to pursue international remedies.121 Other BITs may allow private 
 
 119 See, e.g., Hong Kong-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 8(5); Agreement Between the 
Argentine Republic and Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, art. 25(4), Arg.-
Japan, Dec. 1, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/interna-
tional-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5799/download [hereinafter Argentina-Japan BIT]; 
Agreement Between Japan and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investment, art. 23(4), Japan-Jordan, Nov. 27, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5808/do 
wnload [hereinafter Japan-Jordan BIT]. 
 120 See, e.g., Investment Protection Agreement Between the European Union and Its Mem-
ber States, of the One Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam of the Other Part, art. 3.33, 
Eur.-Viet., June 30, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/in-
ternational-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5868/download [hereinafter E.U.-Vietnam 
BIT]; Economic Partnership Agreement Between the CARIFORUM States, of the One Part, 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Other Part, art. 202-07, 
C.A.R.I.F.O.R.U.M.-U.K., Mar. 22, 2019, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpol-
icy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5822/download [hereinafter 
CARIFORUM-UK BIT]; Free Trade Agreement Between Brazil and Chile, Braz.-Chile, ch. 
21, Nov. 21, 2018, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/interna-
tional-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5821/download [hereinafter Brazil-Chile BIT]. 
 121 See CARIFORUM-UK BIT, supra note 120, at art. 206 (only Parties allowed to initiate 
the special arbitration procedure allowed under the BIT); Brazil-Chile BIT, supra note 120 
(establishing an administrative agency for the resolution of disputes between the investor of 
one state and the other state). 
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investors to bring international arbitration but only under a procedure and tribu-
nal as established under the BIT.122 
 
F. Diplomatic Process 
 
In its BITs, Brazil pioneered a new form of dispute settlement.123 These trea-
ties disallow the foreign investor bringing arbitration; instead, the dispute reso-
lution and prevention mechanisms in these BITs contemplate only resolution 
through diplomatic process between the state parties.124 These BITS do not grant 
the foreign investor a cause of action to bring either before an international arbi-
tral tribunal or domestic courts and instead rely upon the good will of diplomatic 
process to enforce the BIT’s substantive protections.125  Importantly to this study, 
the clauses severely limit the scope of consent to arbitration compared to more 
traditional BIT provisions. A state party may only initiate arbitration after ex-
hausting diplomatic negotiations.126 Even then, the agreement limits arbitration 
to “determin[ing] the conformity with [the] Agreement of a measure that a Party 
claims to be not in conformity with the Agreement.” unless the Parties mutually 
execute a separate instrument.127 
 
 122 See EU-Vietnam BIT, supra note 120, at art. 3.38 (establishing a tribunal to hear all 
claims under the BIT). 
 123 See Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93 at art. 1; Cooperation and Investment Facilitation 
Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Co-Operative Republic of Guy-
ana, art. 1, Braz.-Guy., Dec. 13, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-in-
vestment-agreements/treaty-files/5763/download [hereinafter Brazil-Guyana BIT]; Agree-
ment Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation, art. 2, Braz.-Eth., Apr. 11, 2018, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5717/download [hereinafter Brazil-Ethiopia BIT]; Cooperation and Facilitation Invest-
ment Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Suriname, 
art. 1, Braz.-Surin., May 2, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-invest-
ment-agreements/treaty-files/5715/download [hereinafter Brazil-Suriname BIT]. 
 124 See Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 24; Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at 
art. 24; Brazil-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 123, at art. 23; Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123, 
at art. 24. 
 125 See, e.g., Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 24(3) (“If the measure in question 
affects a specific investor . . . (a) the initial submission shall identify the affected investor; and 
(b) representatives of the affected investor may be invited to appear before the Joint Commit-
tee.”). 
 126 See, e.g., id. at art. 25(1) (“Once the procedure under Paragraph 2 of Article 24 has been 
exhausted and the dispute has not been resolved, either Party may submit the dispute to an ad 
hoc Arbitral Tribunal . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 127 Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 25(2); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at 
art. 25(2); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123, at art. 25(2). See also, e.g., Brazil-UAE BIT, 
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This extreme limitation, while similarly restrictive compared to the severe ex-
haustion requirements found in India’s BITs, strikes at many of the issues that 
concern states in international investment law. It removes agency from the in-
vestors and places the states themselves in control of the dispute settlement pro-
cess. Lack of recourse to the international tribunals for investors may help reduce 
the prercieved abuse of arbitral process by foreign investors as a means to extract 
concessions from the host state.128 
These treaties are largely unproven in practice at the time of this writing, and 
the effects of alternative doctrines and exceptions to the RLR may frustrate these 
treaty provisions. Additionally, the extremely limited right of recourse to any 
treaty violation that invetors have under these treaties would seem to negate a 
reliance interest that the investor has with respect to its treatment by the host 
state. Indeed, these treaties attempt to disclaim any FET standard in the host 
state’s conduct.129 Instead, the treaties attempt to lay out specific guarantees, alt-
hough these also include broad standards similar to FET such as “due process.”130 
This does leave open the possibility that an adjudicatory body could impose the 
customary FET standard into these treaties through those broad guarantees that 
touch upon similar policy concerns as FET clauses and FET jurisprudence.131 
 
supra note 93, at art. 25(13) (contemplating side agreements for arbitration of discrete issues 
such as damages that would otherwise fall outside of article 25’s grant of arbitral jurisdiction). 
 128 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Abuse of Process in International Arbitration, 32 ICSID REV. 
FOREIGN INV.  L.J. 1, 3 (2017) (describing potentially abusive litigation by investors). 
 129 Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(3) (“For greater certainty, the standards of 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ are not covered by this Agree-
ment and shall not be used as interpretive standards in investment dispute settlement proce-
dures.”); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(4) (“For greater certainty, the standards 
of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security shall not be used or raised by 
either Party to this Agreement as a ground for any dispute settlement procedure in relation to 
the application or the interpretation of this Agreement.”); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 
123, BIT at art. 4(3) (“For greater certainty, the standards of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and 
‘full protection and security’ are not governed covered by this Agreement and shall not be 
used as interpretive standards in investment dispute settlement procedures.”). 
 130 Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(2) (guarantees against “(i) Denial of access to 
justice in any judicial or administrative proceedings; (ii) Breach of due process; (iii) Targeted 
discrimination . . . ; (iv) Manifestly abusive treatment . . . ; [and] (v) Discrimination against 
investments of investors of the other Party in law enforcement and the provision of public 
security”); Brazil-Guyana BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(1) (employing the exact same lan-
guage as the Brazil-UAE BIT); Brazil-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(2) (“Each Con-
tracting Party shall grant to investments and investors of the other Contracting Party treatment 
according to the due process of law.”); Brazil-Suriname BIT, supra note 123, at art. 4(2) (“In 
line with the principles of this Agreement, each Party shall ensure that all measures that affect 
investment are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner, in accordance 
with the due process of law and their respective legislation.”). 
 131 See, supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
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IV. LIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY FRAMEWORK 
 
While many of the newly-negotiated BITs attempt to resolve on a state-by-
state basis the issues with the international investment system, the system itself 
presents limitations which dilute the efficacy of any one of these individual BITs. 
Particularly, the doctrines of futility, emergency measures, and effects of Most-
Favored Nation clauses, as well as legal “x-factors” such as interference by 
courts or diplomacy, may limit the effects of any of these individual BITs. Some 
BITs have specifically attempted to reduce the impact of these doctrines;132 how-
ever, the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s are, at the time of this writing, largely 
untested, such that the efficacy of these attempts to reduce the impact of other 
doctrines is unclear.   
 
A. Futility Doctrine 
 
Under the futility exception to the RLR, investment tribunals excused non-
compliance with exhaustion in domestic courts.133 The futility exception allows 
a litigant to bypass the customary requirements of exhaustion of local remedies 
when pursuing those remedies would be futile because of some issue or inherent 
inequality in the local judicial systems.134 While this exception is theoretically 
“exceptional,” only some tribunals strictly apply the exception, with others being 
more lenient or somewhere in between.135 While some commentators insist that 
 
 132 See, e.g., Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater cer-
tainty, the [Most-Favored Nation Treatment provision] shall not encompass international dis-
pute resolution procedures . . . .”); Turkey-Cambodia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(4)(c) 
(Most-Favored Nation treatment “shall not apply in respect of dispute settlement provisions 
. . . .”); Morocco-Congo BIT, supra note 110, at art. 3(2) ([“Most-favored-nation treatment 
will not apply with respect to the right of an investor to submit a dispute arising out of this 
Agreement to any dispute settlement procedure other than as provided in this agreement.”]); 
Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 93, at art. 4(6) (Most-Favored Nation treatment “does not include 
treatment accorded to investors of a non-Contracting Party and their investments by provisions 
concerning the settlement of investment disputes”). 
 133 Zachary Mollengarden, The Utility of Futility: Local Remedies Rules in International 
Investment Law, 58 VA. J. INT’L L. 403, 405 (2019). 
 134 Id. at 415. 
 135 Id. at 38–41. 
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the proper standard should be more restrictive “obvious futility,”136 tribunals in-
voke this exception in a wide variety of controversies.137   
 
B. Emergency Measures and Other Crises 
 
Some BIT protections are unenforceable in times of economic crisis or other 
emergencies.138 Most BITs contain some form of “essential security clause,” 
which tends to undermine the FET guarantees in BITs by allowing states to take 
emergency actions without regard to treaty obligations. Measures taken by states 
in emergency circumstances are thus not ordinarily subjected to the rigors and 
standards laid out in BITs. Such emergency measures may constitute an excep-
tion to the usual case that states use the renegotiated ISDS processes to protect 
their interests. 
The most well-known invocation of emergency measures which disrupted BIT 
protections were Argentina’s defenses for actions it took during its economic 
crisis of 2001.139 When Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt, Argentina’s 
creditors resorted to ISDS.140 In the arbitral proceedings, Argentina’s govern-
ment attempted to assert the defense of necessity to the economic emergency.141 
The panel adopted the necessity jurisprudence of the WTO, which narrowed the 
protections of BITs for the host state in crisis by imposing a demanding test for 
necessity.142 According to some scholars, such a solution “hamper[s] the ability 
of governments to balance creditor demands and regulatory objectives.”143 
 
 136 Id. at 430. 
 137 Id. at 438–41. 
 138 See El Paso Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 
¶¶ 614–15 (Oct. 31, 2011) (holding that stability established by a BIT cannot be total, “espe-
cially when extraordinary circumstances appear”). See generally Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Ap-
plication of BITs in Time of Economic Crisis: Limits to Their Coverage, Necessity and the 
Relevance of WTO Law, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOST STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014). Measures taken in times of economic 
crises can affect foreign investors in particular and disproportionately, especially when gov-
ernments make dramatic structural changes to their economy to reinforce domestic industries. 
Id. at 1, 6. 
 139 See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 14–19; Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Tribu-
nalizing Sovereign Debt: Argentina’s Experience with Investor–State Dispute Settlement, 50 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1033, 1054–58 (2017). 
 140 For a succinct reporting of this history, see Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 14–19. 
 141 Id. at 14–15. 
 142 Id. at 17–18. 
 143 Park & Samples, supra note 139, at 1062. Park and Samples also noted that these arbi-
trations opened “a new frontier in the already fragmented global sovereign debt market . . . 
presenting new challenges to sovereign autonomy in the global financial system.” Id. The pan-
els’ interpretations of the Argentine BITs are comparable to the challenges facing India before 
2021] EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION REFORM 397 
However, panels have been inconsistent and unclear when interpreting the ne-
cessity standard.144 Practically, then, “this defense is difficult to invoke except in 
the most exceptional and desperate circumstances.”145 
Argentina in those proceedings did not invoke—or at least the panels did not 
review—an “essential security” argument that others may seek to invoke to ef-
fect a more protectionist trade and investment policy or to skirt unfavorable BIT 
requirements. In 2019, though, a WTO panel addressed the interpretation of the 
GATT national security exception in its Russia—Traffic in Transit report.146 
Some ISDS arbitral panels had already incorporated existing WTO jurisprudence 
regarding emergency measures and essential security exceptions into their BIT 
jurisprudence.147 The WTO panel held that the national security exception found 
in GATT article XXI was narrower than previously thought and invoked.148 Be-
cause ISDS tribunals had already adopted the WTO necessity jurisprudence and 
because of international law’s policy goal of interpreting treaties to conform with 
other standards of international law, investment dispute tribunals may adopt this 
new standard of necessity.149 However, imposing this WTO jurisprudence 
wholesale into the BIT context would not fully take into account the policy im-
plications that the parties to BITs had.150 
 
C. MFN Provisions 
 
The application of the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) provisions to ISDS gen-
erates significant uncertainty in the efficacy of BITs negotiated in the late-2010s. 
MFN provisions date to the beginnings of international law and international 
commercial agreements.151 They assure that one contracting state party receives 
the most favorable tariff rates and any other trade benefits granted by the other 
 
it reexamined its BIT program to invoke more severe restrictions on international arbitration.  
See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 144 See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 19. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.20, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS512/7 (adopted Apr. 26, 2019). 
 147 See, e.g., Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 
Award, ¶ 194 (Sep. 5, 2008) (citing Report of the Panel, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports 
of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.104, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted June 12, 2007)). 
 148 Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 146, ¶ 7.33 (interpreting the national security 
exception to the GATT as requiring an objective crisis in international affairs). 
 149 See Sacerdoti, supra note 138, at 19–23. 
 150 Id. at 22–23. 
 151 See generally S. Hornbeck, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 3(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 797 
(1909). 
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party to any other state.152 In the context of international trade law, the GATT’s 
MFN provision multilateralizes trade benefits without necessitating individual 
negotiations among contracting parties.153   
States adopted MFN provisions in the realm of international investment law 
to augment substantive provisions granting preferential investment allow-
ances.154 However, some litigants have attempted to secure procedural benefits 
through MFN provisions by bypassing exhaustion requirements through the in-
corporation of more liberal forum choice provisions in other BITs. 
The first arbitration panel to endorse the view that MFN provisions covered 
dispute resolution procedures was Maffezini v. Spain.155 There, Emilio Agustín 
Maffezini, an Argentine national, submitted a request for arbitration to the arbi-
tral tribunal against the Kingdom of Spain without complying with exhaustion 
requirements in the Argentina-Spain BIT.156 Rather, Maffezini argued that he 
had the right to access international arbitration under the Chile-Spain BIT, incor-
porated through the MFN provision of the Argentina-Spain BIT.157 Spain coun-
terargued that dispute resolution procedures fell outside of the purview of the 
MFN clause because the dispute resolution provisions were not core substantive 
provisions.158 The tribunal concluded that dispute settlement procedures were 
“inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors” and “were essential 
for the adequate protection of the rights they sought to guarantee.”159 The 
 
 152 See id. at 797. 
 153 See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 58 (6th ed. 1994).  
But see GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 107–
31 (1992) (offering an early criticism of MFN provisions in the context of GATT trade nego-
tiations because of the rising importance of regional and strategic preferential trade agreements 
under GATT art. XXIV). 
 154 Berschader v. Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award of Apr. 21, 2006, ¶ 179 
(Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) (declaring that “it is universally 
agreed that the very essence of an MFN provision in a BIT is to afford investors all material 
protection provided by subsequent treaties”). An interesting debate in this realm regards to 
what extent these individual clauses incorporate the history and customary international law 
of MFN provisions. Compare Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: 
Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2(1) J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97, 99–101, 108–13 (2011) 
(arguing that States considered the customary significance of the MFN terms of art), with 
Stephanie L. Parker, A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 ARB. BRIEF 30, 43–44 (2012) (argu-
ing that under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties the primary means of interpreting 
treaties is a textual ordinary meaning in light of object and purpose reading). 
 155 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000). 
 156 Id. ¶ 26 (“Claimant admits that the dispute was not referred to a Spanish court prior to 
its submission to the Centre.”). 
 157 Id. ¶¶ 38–40. 
 158 Id. ¶ 40. 
 159 Id. ¶ 54. 
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Maffezini panel decision on jurisdiction leads a line of reason that has been fol-
lowed by other arbitral panels.160 
The leading panel decision in opposition to Maffezini is Tecmed v. Mexico.161 
There, the panel declined to follow the reasoning of the Maffezini panel where 
the claimant asked the panel to allow a claim through the applicable BIT’s MFN 
clause.162 The panel considered the dispute resolution provisions negotiated by 
the parties to the operative BIT to be substantive in nature and reflect key policy 
choices by the negotiating state parties.163 The reasoning of the Tecmed panel 
has been adopted by a minority of panels in a line of cases rejecting the Maffezini 
holding that would incorporate provisions of other BITs through MFN clauses.164 
The holding of the Maffezini panel and subsequent panels in its line of reason-
ing is consistent with the view that the RLR is procedural in its nature.165 The 
Maffezini panel did not delve into a policy discussion on Spain’s sovereign in-
terest as Spain invited it to, but the panel did weigh heavily policy equities that 
favored the claimant.166 Likewise, the procedural theory of the RLR is more 
likely to be “influenced and . . . modified by the consideration of interests other 
 
 160 See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 103, 109 (Aug. 3, 2004) (following the Maffezini panel in applying the 
MFN clause to dispute resolution procedures, finding that any public policy considerations in 
favor of a stronger Rule of Local Remedies were inapplicable); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 108 (June 21, 2011) (noting there has been 
“near-unanimity in finding that the [MFN] clause covered the dispute settlement rules” in 
cases where the clause referred to “‘all matters’ or ‘any matter’ regulated in the BIT”); see 
also Andreas R. Ziegler, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 67–74 (August Reinsisch ed., 2008) (tracing the history of these 
arbitration panels considering the MFN implications to procedural qualities). 
 161 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. FILJ 158 (2004). 
 162 Id. ¶ 69. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See, e.g., Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 172 (Dec. 8, 2008) (“The requirement of [recourse to local courts] can 
only be dispensed with by some ‘legitimate’ extension of rights and benefits by means of the 
operation of the (MFN) Clause – that is to say when the text of the MFN clause . . . permits 
the interpreter of the treaty to conclude that this was the clear and unambiguous intention of 
the Contracting Parties.”); ICS Inspection and Control Services (United Kingdom) v. Republic 
of Argentina, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 263–82 (Feb. 10, 2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0416.pdf (finding that there was 
no compelling reason to disregard the restrictions of jurisdiction of the international arbitration 
tribunal made by the contracting parties to the BIT). Adherents to this analytical framework 
include dissenting opinions in the Maffezini line of cases. See, e.g., Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Professor 
Brigitte Stern (June 21, 2011). 
 165 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 416. 
 166 Maffezini, supra note 155, at ¶¶ 54–56. 
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than those of the host or respondent state.”167 Consistent with the acceptance of 
the RLR as a procedural requirement, the Maffezini line of reasoning with respect 
to the application of MFN clauses to procedural rights is the majority view 
among investor-state dispute settlement arbitration panels.168 In contrast, the line 
of reasoning endorsed by the Tecmed panel supports broadly the substantive the-
ory of the RLR. The substantive theory of the RLR values the state’s sovereignty 
interest above any other policy equity.169 The policies considered by the Tecmed 
panel reflect this preference for enforcement of the state’s sovereignty interest in 
the choice of forum clause.170 
This division in the authority from the investment tribunals generates uncer-
tainty among the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, which in many ways re-
sponded to this division in authority. Some of the BITs negotiated in the late-
2010s have specific carve-outs within their MFN provisions to attempt to fore-
close a panel applying the Maffezini line of reasoning.171 Even in the face of a 
strong textual imperative, a panel holding to the procedural theory of the RLR 
will likely be inclined to find a waiver or exception to the RLR in favor of a 
claimant, weighing the policy interests of the claimant over the policy interests 
of the state. 
 
D. “X-Factors”—Non-Traditional or Non-Legal Frustrations of BITs 
 
The use of non-traditional or non-legal means to gain an advantage or pursue 
other interests present the most unpredictable limitation upon the international 
investment system grounded in BITs. Such “x-factors” can have a chilling effect 
upon the foreign investor or dramatically raise transaction costs for either making 
and managing investments or vindicating the rights of both the foreign investor 
and the host state. 
One such “x-factor” is the invocation of local or third-party courts after an 
arbitral award to frustrate the enforcement of ISDS awards. A well-known ex-
ample of this tactic is the saga of BG Group, PLC’s arbitration against the Re-
public of Argentina under the Argentina-UK BIT.172 Following Argentina’s 2001 
 
 167 AMERASINGHE, supra note 29, at 13. 
 168 See RUBINS ET AL., supra note 39, at 262–63 (recognizing ambiguity in the authorities 
regarding whether an MFN provision applies to procedural rights but supporting Maffezini as 
representing the majority rule). 
 169 Id. at 397. 
 170 Tecmed, supra note 161, ¶ 69. 
 171 E.g. Indonesia-Australia BIT, supra note 110, at art. 14.5(3) (“For greater certainty, the 
[MFN clause] shall not encompass international dispute resolution procedures . . . .”). 
 172 See Arturo C. Porzecanski, The Origins of Argentina’s Litigation and Arbitration Saga, 
2002-2016, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 41 (2016) (giving an extensive history of the scope of the 
legal challenges Argentina faced between 2002 and 2016). 
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economic crisis and its default on its sovereign debt, BG Group initiated interna-
tional arbitration proceedings against the Republic of Argentina on April 25, 
2003.173 The arbitration panel convened in 2004 in Washington, D.C. and New 
York, and held proceedings through 2006, with a unanimous panel ruling in BG 
Group’s favor on December 24, 2007.174 As part of its legal conclusions, the 
arbitration panel concluded that BG Group could bypass the requirement to ex-
haust local remedies, rejecting Argentina’s reliance on its state of emergency to 
exonerate it from liability.175 On March 21, 2008, Argentina filed a petition to 
vacate or modify the arbitration award in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia, claiming a right to relief under the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”).176 On June 7, 2010, the D.C. District Court issued a ruling in BG 
Group’s favor, finding that the arbitration award did not present any issue that 
the court could adjudicate under the FAA.177 On January 27, 2012, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the courts could review the 
arbitration award’s discussion of jurisdiction de novo because the parties had not 
consented to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.178 The U.S. Supreme Court ulti-
mately reversed on March 5, 2014, finding the arbitrators’ determinations law-
ful.179 
While U.S. court system ultimately affirmed the arbitration panel’s decision, 
Argentina’s litigation frustrated the outcome of the arbitration for six and a half 
years beyond the panel’s award judgement. BG Group’s litigation, initiated in 
April 2003 and concluded March 2014, is not an outlier in international arbitra-
tion jurisprudence. Argentina’s “rogue behavior” in its attempts to frustrate the 
ISDS system and other mechanisms of international economic law no longer 
seem out of the ordinary.180 In addition, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
 
 173 Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 112, 114. 
 177 Id. at 126. The D.C. District Court accepted that it had the power to review the arbitral 
award under the U.S. Congress’s authorization of the New York Convention on the Recogni-
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would seem to bolster the finality of the decisions of international arbitration 
bodies, parties seeking to avoid the effects of arbitral awards often invoke U.S. 
domestic courts to attack awards.181 
Diplomacy can also frustrate the BIT system and international trade and in-
vestment generally. While some BITs place emphasis on some peaceful or dip-
lomatic dispute resolution, the ad hoc negotiations that occurred in the United 
States-China negotiations in the late-2010s lacked an adequate resolution frame-
work, and an abundance of distrust strained negotiations and relationships.182 
Further, those negotiations struggled to gather the support of the U.S. business 
community, which then-U.S. President Trump viewed as essential to the success 
of the negotiations.183 This diplomatic space, though, can offer many benefits to 
the states by increased control over the dispute and dispute resolution process. 
To take advantage of such potential benefits, states must understand their role in 
ISDS and the BIT regime.   
Under the international investment treaty framework, States are inherently 
both parties and respondents to actions brought under them. Thus, BITs and the 
ISDS process are neither purely public international law nor private commercial 
agreements and arbitration. If BITs are purely public international law, treaty 
parties can, at any time, undermine not only investors’ expectation but also tri-
bunals’ dispute resolution powers.184 However, if considered purely private 
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Administration demands). Interests within the business community that run against the inter-
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accompanying text. 
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arbitrations, dispute settlement mechanisms can “assert and establish new legal 
norms, often in unintended ways.”185 Although states largely delegated interpre-
tive power over BITs to international tribunals, the states also attempted to retain 
and exercise this power—to disparate ends.186 One commentator argued that 
states and parties should engage in an interpretive dialogue on the interpretation 
of treaties within the international investment arbitration regime.187 The limita-
tions of this approach stem from the reality that few BITs include the textual 
mechanisms by which parties may express an opinion on the interpretation of the 
BITs before or during ISDS  arbitration.188 However, as international investment 
law evolves, dissatisfied states may demand greater influence in the ISDS sys-
tem.189 Thus, as states increase their power in the international investment sys-
tem, states and investors will likely resort to diplomatic approaches to resolution 




By the beginning of the 2020s, many states had renegotiated BITs and as part 
of the global reorientation of international trade and investment law and the re-
turn of economic protectionism as a legitimate policy interest. Specifically in the 
BITs negotiated in the late-2010s, states attempted to reimpose the RLR and claw 
back liberal grants of arbitral authority to the ISDS system. These steps were a 
reaction to the abuse of ISDS by investors at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century and the perceived encroachment on state sovereignty interests by the ar-
bitral panels. Where BIT negotiations in the wake of the Uruguay Round and 
founding of the WTO stressed the liberalization and globalization of the interna-
tional economy,190 states negotiating BITs in the late-2010s were more conscious 
of the potential shortfalls of BITs and ISDS.   
As evidenced by the sampling of BITs studied in this Note, the policy equities 
considered by the states negotiating these BITs led to a more confusing frame-
work. For example, an investor from the UAE has startling different rights in a 
dispute depending on whether the investment is in Hong Kong, Japan, Mali, 
 
 185 Id. at 184 (quoting Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
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 188 Id. at 216. 
 189 Id. at 192. 
 190 See World Investment Report 2015, supra note 7, at 123–24. 
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Uruguay, or Brazil.191 The continued failure to conclude a multilateral treaty gov-
erning (or at least setting a framework for) the international investment regime 
has resulted in a system that undermines the system’s goals of encouraging FDI. 
Especially within treaty frameworks such as those of Brazil or India, investors 
may lose confidence in the state and its commitment to cooperation in the preser-
vation and promotion of FDI. Without a robust procedure for the protection of 
the investors’ expectations, there is a significant opportunity for opportunistic 
behavior by state actors after FDI is made. Thus, investors will have to factor in 
this potential for opportunistic behavior into their economic calculations when 
deciding to engage in FDI. 
Of course, international tribunals and other forms of ISDS could import addi-
tional protections to investors and FDI through customary international law doc-
trines such as the FET standard192 or through MFN clauses. Tribunals also may 
be less willing to accept the imposition of the RLR in these BITs or more willing 
to find customary exceptions to the RLR. In the majority theory of the RLR, the 
RLR is merely procedural and may be waived under customary international law 
through a balancing test that weighs the sovereignty interest of the host country 
against the fairness and reliance of the foreign claimant.193 Implicit in the ISDS 
forum choice clauses of many of the BITs discussed in this Note is a policy fa-
voring the sovereignty interests of the host state. They in effect ask tribunals to 
accept the substantive view of the RLR—the minority view.194 This could lead 
to a frustration of the interests behind BITs that favor the interests of the host 
state’s sovereignty.   
Ultimately, though, it is the further erosion of the investors’ reliance that is the 
greatest shortcomings of the BITs negotiated in the late-2010s. While intrinsic 
bias in the BIT system and abuse by investor-litigants in the ISDS system re-
vealed the issues in the international investment system at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the swing in economic policy towards protectionism that is 
inherent in many BITs negotiated in the late-2010s is to the detriment of FDI.  
As explored in this Note, both investors and states have tactics and strategies to 
frustrate the FDI system without protectionist treaties through doctrines such as 
national security and emergency as well as litigation games and old-fashioned 
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diplomacy. The restrictions to the procedural protections made in many BITs 
negotiated in the late-2010s are not necessary for the ends they seek. Contempo-
raneously to some of those BITs negotiations, trade commentators feared that 
they would stem the flow of FDI.195 The BITs that place extreme limitations upon 
the procedural rights of the foreign investors are unfavorable because of the det-
rimental impact they will have on the foreign investors’ reliance interests and 





 195 See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
